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A relatively high labor-intensity in government-run entities need not imply slack in their 
organization. Rather, it is a rational reaction to various forms of wage tax advantage that the 
public sector has over private firms. Even though an unequal tax treatment of public and 
private sectors precludes production efficiency, it may improve welfare by mitigating the 
labor supply distortion. With inelastic labor supply, privatizing a previously government-run 
sector improves welfare, while with elastic labor supply a full outsourcing of government 
activities can never be optimal if it goes along with a decrease in net wages. 
JEL Code: L33, D24, H21. 




Centre for Economic and Business Research 
(CEBR) 






Department of Economics 








Great parts of this paper were written while Andreas Wagener visited Centre for Economic 
and Business Research (CEBR) in Copenhagen. He wishes to thank CEBR for its outstanding 
hospitality. Financial support from the Danish Social Science Research Council is gratefully 
acknowledged. Seminar participants in Vienna, Bangkok, and Munich provided valuable 
comments and stimulating criticism. 
 1 Introduction
The main thrust of outsourcing and privatization is eﬃciency: Government-run enterprises
or services often are thought to absorb substantial portions of the state budget without
generating commensurate contributions to social welfare. Moreover, lack of competition
and incentives, X-ineﬃciency, a soft budget constraint, and the failure to price properly
inputs and outputs may result in signiﬁcant misallocation of resources and welfare losses.
Privatization and outsourcing of government activities have been essential in transforming
former socialist economies. Also many market economies have chosen to privatize public
utilities and state-owned enterprises or to outsource parts of government activities to the
private sector (e.g., telephone services, waste collection and treatment, public transport,
hospitals, and prisons).1 Over the last 10 to 15 years, central government employment
(excluding teachers and health sector) in OECD countries decreased from 2.9 to 1.9% of
the population and the governmental wage bill reduced from 5.5 to 4.4% of GDP.2 Local
government administration employs in average 2.5 and teaching and health care 3.4 % of
OECD population (Schiavo-Campo et al., 2003).
Privatization and outsourcing often result in lower labor inputs in the privatized ﬁrms (for
a recent survey see Megginson and Netter 2001). E.g., in a study on 63 privatizations,
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) report a signiﬁcant decline in the labor intensity after
privatization. In a study on 218 privatizations in Mexico, La Porta and L` opez-de-Silanes
(1999) found that output on average increased by 54.3% while employment declined by
almost half, which indicates a tremendous increase in labor productivity.3 This is largely
regarded as evidence that, under government-ownership, there had been overmanning
and slack working practices, ineﬃciencies that private ﬁrms could not aﬀord under the
pressure of the marketplace.
While from everyday experience we would not dismiss the ineﬃciency hypothesis for the
public sector entirely, we propose in this paper a diﬀerent potential explanation why pri-
1For a survey on state-ownership and privatization in the Western world, see the edited volume by
Toninelli (2000).
2For Non-OECD countries, ﬁgures may be dramatically diﬀerent. Furthermore, for many countries
data availability is very poor.
3An empirical investigation by Megginson et al. (1994) does, however, indicate an opposite eﬀect on
employment: In their sample of 18 countries they ﬁnd that privatizsation on average led to a rise in
employment following privatization.
1vate ﬁrms have leaner workforces than state-run ﬁrms: They operate under a diﬀerent tax
regime with respect to factor inputs. Suppose that the government levies a distortionary
wage tax. For a private ﬁrm, this means that if its workers should earn a certain net
wage, the ﬁrm faces a higher labor cost (obviously, the gross wage) parts of which go to
the government. If the ﬁrm is a state-owned, then the employees’ net wage reﬂects the
full labor cost for the government – since, by consolidating accounts, all intra-government
tax payments net out. Thus, the government incurs a lower labor cost than a private
ﬁrm and will hire a larger workforce than a private ﬁrm that produces the same level of
output. Moreover, production in the tax-preferred realm of government is, ceteris paribus,
less costly than production in the private sector.
However, reasoning under the ceteris-paribus assumption might be quite misleading in
this context: Nationalizations or privatizations may impact on factor prices, output in
other sectors, factor supplies, and the tax rate necessary to ﬁnance government expendi-
ture. In this paper, we therefore employ a general-equilibrium model to study the eﬀects
of contracting out or outsourcing previously government-run activities in the case that
the government has a tax advantage over private ﬁrms on the employment of labor. Con-
sider an economy with two factors (labor and capital) and two sectors. Labor supply is
endogenous and, possibly, distorted by taxation. One of the two sectors is always pri-
vately organized, while the other can be either government-controlled or privately-run.
Real-world examples include hospitals, schools, public transportation, and utilities. We
assume that output in this sector is provided to the citizenry free of charge by the gov-
ernment.
We compare two scenarios: one where the sector is outsourced (private economy) and one
where it is run by the government (mixed economy). In the privatization case output will
be purchased by the government which ﬁnances its purchases or factor expenses via a tax
levied on labor. Since employment in the government sector is eﬀectively not subject to
labor taxation, production in the government sector will exhibit a higher labor intensity
than in the private sector. We show that this pattern is not only a partial-equilibrium
eﬀect but also emerges when comparing the general equilibria of the mixed and the private
economy. Moreover, it may (but need not) happen that the labor-market clearing after-tax
wage (where the tax rate is adjusted such as to balance the government budget) is higher
in the mixed than in the private economy, implying a smaller distortion on labor supply.
2However, should this happen, it comes at a cost: Due to the government’s tax advantage
the allocation of factors across sectors in the mixed economy is distorted, implying a loss
in overall output. Hence, society faces a trade-oﬀ between production eﬃciency (realized
in the private economy) and small tax distortions (realized in the mixed economy). We
identify conditions (mainly in terms of the elasticity of labor supply) such that either
welfare loss is preferable to the other. In particular, we identify cases where it is optimal
(in the second-best sense) to deviate from full privatization and, thereby, to entertain one
sector in the economy with a labor intensity that would appear ineﬃciently high under
market conditions.
We assume that government entities take wage and interest levels as given. When hiring
labor, the government recognizes that it receives back (or is exempt from paying) at least
some part of the taxes that a private ﬁrm would have to pay for the same sort of operations.
The tax asymmetry between the government and the private sector can, however, take on
diﬀerent degrees: A fully centralized government whose oﬃcials perfectly see through the
consolidated state budget would recognize that, in eﬀect, it does not carry any tax burden
at all. However, the government need not be that monolithic: E.g., the organization of
public production may be spread over diﬀerent ministries or departments, each of them
being small relative to the whole government. The recruiters in these agencies may only
partially see through to consolidated government budgets, and the cost accounting in
their agencies may be based on statutory rather than net factor costs. The perceived tax
advantage for the government would then be smaller than the full tax rate. Alternatively,
consider that production takes place at a lower, say, the municipal level in a federal
state such that only parts of the total tax on labor accrues to, and therefore is irrelevant
from the perspective of, the employing municipalities. For such settings, there is some
evidence that local governments are responsive to tax incentives, for example as concerns
the VAT treatment of their activities. Wassenaar and Gradus (2004) compare its eﬀect
on outsourcing for seven EU countries and Norway. They ﬁnd that a refund scheme for
VAT costs of local governments facilitates outsourcing. Finally, varying degrees for the
tax advantage of the government over private ﬁrms may result from diﬀerent types of
employment. In many countries, people working for the government can be separated
into civil servants and “normal” employees, for whom standard labor legislation applies
(see, e.g., Cardona, 2002). In some countries (e.g., in Germany, Italy, and Austria),
3civil servants do not pay social security taxes (old-age income, unemployment, or health
insurance), or pay only to a lesser extent, while employees typically do. This prima
facie makes civil servants the less costly staﬀ type to the government, limiting, however,
the government’s tax advantage to the degree to which it relies on civil servants as its
personnel. By introducing a parameter which can take values between zero and one,
our analysis takes into account that the government’s actual or perceived tax advantage
over the private sector depends, to a considerable extent, on institutional features of
government organization.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature. Section
3 presents the model. In Section 4 we then derive the diﬀerences in factor allocations,
factor prices, and tax rates that result from the diﬀerent organizational modes in a mixed
and in a private economy. Section 5 reports our main ﬁndings on welfare comparisons.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on why private ﬁrms are more productive than public
enterprises. Most popular is a Alchian-Demsetz type property-rights argument: Since
there is no residual claimant in public enterprises, nobody really cares about its eﬃ-
ciency. Hence, workers slack oﬀ. Other explanations for the perceived ineﬃciency of
the public sector range from political interference over the pursuit of objectives that are
unrelated to eﬃciency to soft budget constraints and monopoly power in the output mar-
ket. As observed in Mintz et al. (2000), taxation is a largely overlooked issue in the
debate on privatization. Independently of any other eﬀects, diﬀerential tax treatment
between public and private sector amounts to substantial diﬀerences in eﬀective marginal
tax rates that, upon privatization or nationalization, would necessitate a re-allocation of
factors of production. Tax issues play a role when privatization is made for the sake of
levelling the playing ﬁeld for all competitors in the market. Private ﬁrms, competing
against public ﬁrms, often complain that tax treatment for public ﬁrms is more favorable,
thereby generating artiﬁcial competitive advantages for such ﬁrms over investor-owned
ﬁrms. Economists would add that diﬀerential tax treatment of ﬁrms of the same type
4generates distortions and ineﬃciencies.4
In this paper we look at the relationship between privatization and taxation from a
general-equilibrium perspective. Such a view is hardly ever taken in the literature —
with three notable exceptions to which our contribution is related:
In a model where a range of production activities can, with diﬀerent technologies, be
carried out by either the government or by the private sector, Huizinga and Nielsen (2001)
investigate the optimal boundary between public and private production. Their focus is
on capital income taxation (which distorts private investment decisions), but the analysis
could be recast as to deal with labor income taxes.5 Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) predict
that the size of the public sector, measured by the range of activities that are carried out
through the state, is larger the higher is the budgetary need for, or the marginal damage
resulting from, distortionary taxation. Moreover, privatization would generally go along
with a decrease in the use of the taxed factor. For a simpler economy, our paper comes
to quite similar conclusions — without having to resort to diﬀerences in the eﬃciencies
of private and public production. In our framework, outsourcing may be beneﬁcial or
counterproductive even when the government and the private sector have access to the
same production technologies.
Gordon et al. (1999) argue that organizing production in an ineﬃcient government sector
may be acceptable for society when the deadweight loss of taxation is suﬃciently large.
They argue that the ineﬃciency of the public sector is less than proportionately related
to its size while the eﬃciency costs of taxation increase more than proportionately with
the tax rate. At some point, nationalization of industries gets cheaper than ﬁnancing gov-
ernment purchases through distortionary taxation. Unlike our similar-sounding ﬁnding,
this results rests on an in-built ineﬃciency in the government sector. We replace this as-
sumption by adding a second sector to the economy. For eﬃciency, the two sectors should
4In their case study on the (planned, but not executed) privatization of Ontario Hydro, a Canadian
electricity company, Mintz et al. (2000) illustrate this for the case of capital, land and property taxes
in the province of Ontario. However, by ignoring revenue impacts for the government and under a strict
ceteris paribus clause, the focus in Mintz et al. (2000) is on the incentives in re-structuring the ﬁrm
rather than on an overall assessment of the tax issue.
5Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) predict over-capitalization of the public sector in the presence of capital
income taxes. This is at odds with reality which is characterized by an under-capitalized private sector
(see also Gordon, 2003). Replacing capital by labor taxation would, however, render the model’s forecasts
compatible with reality.
5not face diﬀerent factor price ratios – but in the mixed economy they do, generating an
endogenous ineﬃciency of public production.
In Gordon (2003), the focus is on the role of state-owned banks. By providing cheap loans,
state-owned banks may help to counteract underinvestment problems in the private sector,
caused by capital income taxation. Gordon also suggests that public ﬁrms may be more
labor-intensive than private ones as the government may use state-owned ﬁrms to hire
workers that would otherwise be unemployed, or hire unskilled workers to drive up their
equilibrium wage. We assume that there is no capital income taxation and that labor
markets are competitive, two conditions under which the model developed by Gordon
(2003) would not predict any positive role for public ownership. Our model allows such
a role since we endogenize labor supply. With exogenous labor supply, also our model
predicts that privatization or outsourcing is always optimal.
3 The Model
Consider a closed economy with two sectors i = 1,2. Sector i uses labor Li and capital
Ki to produce its output; there are no intermediate inputs. Good 1 will be provided and
tax-ﬁnanced (but not necessarily produced) by the government, and for good 2 we choose
units such that it has unit price. Technologies are represented by neoclassical production
functions F i = F i(Li,Ki) which are assumed to have the standard monotonicity and
concavity properties. Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts, we assume, in particular,
that F i
L > 0, F i
K > 0, F i
LL < 0, F i
KK < 0, and F i
LLF i
KK−(FKL)2 ≥ 0 for all (Li,Ki) ∈ R2
++.
We assume that the supply of capital is ﬁxed at a level ¯ K. Full employment of capital
therefore requires that
K1 + K2 = ¯ K (1)
always holds. We assume that the economy is populated by one (representative) individual
who has preferences over the consumption of goods 1 and 2 and over leisure. We assume
that the solution to the utility maximization problem gives rise to a supply function for
labor that increases in the net wage rate:
LS = LS[w(1 − t)]
6with L0








the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net wage.
In a labor market equilibrium the labor intake of the two sectors equals labor supply:
L1 + L2 = LS[w(1 − t)]. (2)
We assume that sector 2 is always privately run and operating in a proﬁt-maximizing way.
Denoting by r the rental price of capital, proﬁts in sector 2 amount to
Π2 = F
2(L2,K2) − r · K2 − w · L2.
Proﬁt maximization requires that marginal productivities equal factor prices (subscripts
to production functions indicate partial derivatives):
F
2
L(L2,K2) = w (3)
F
2
K(L2,K2) = r. (4)
Sector 1 can be either government-operated or privately-run (think, e.g., of hospitals).
We assume that the sector has to provide a certain and invariant level ¯ F 1 of output:
F
1(L1,K1) ≥ ¯ F
1. (5)
We assume that production is organized in a cost-minimizing manner. This is a prereq-
uisite for proﬁt maximization and therefore appears to be an appropriate hypothesis in
case the sector is in private hands. Assuming cost eﬃciency in the public sector might
be more controversial, given that there seems to be ample of evidence for governmental
slack. We use the assumption of cost eﬃciency in order to deliberately ban all reasons for
outsourcing that might obtain from an ineﬃcient organization of the public sector.





1(L1,K1) ≥ ¯ F
1￿
. (6)
To assess labor costs, the private ﬁrm uses the gross, tax-inclusive wage rate. A
fraction t of wages are paid to the government as a wage tax such that workers earn










and the output requirement (5).




rK1 + w(1 − t)L1|F
1(L1,K1) ≥ ¯ F
1￿
. (8)
The diﬀerence to the private-sector problem is that the government can use the net
wage rate w(1−t) to assess labor costs. When deciding on factor demands person-
nel recruiters in the government sector, thus, take gross and net wages as given but
regard the government (or the entity to which they are hiring) as being eﬀectively
tax-exempt. Such a view would emerge if the recruiter, somewhat heroically, recog-
nized that taxes paid by government entities cancel out entirely upon consolidation










and, again, the output requirement (5).
Generalizing (6) and (8), we can introduce parameter α with α ∈ [0,1] to measure the
extent to which the government has, or its authorities that recruit staﬀ into government
services perceive the government to have, a relative tax advantage over the private sector:
α = 0 would be equivalent to the outsourcing production of good 1 to the private sector,
with α = 1 the public sector fully sees through its accounting mechanisms.6 Variable α
may reﬂect the degree to which employees in government-run entities are exempt from
taxes or contributions that are collected in the private sector.
6With some leap of faith in the existence of aggregate production functions, one might also interpret
α as the fraction of sector 1 that is government-operated. Such an interpretation might be appropriate
for the case of public transport, where only parts of the network might be operated through private
companies. However, this interpretation requires that production in sector 1 could be additively aggre-
gated from a number of micro-production functions – which will only be possible under quite restrictive
conditions. Cf., e.g., Felipe and Fisher (2003).
8The variable α might also give rise to an interpretation in terms of a federalist structure.
Suppose, e.g., that sector 1 is the hospital sector, run by local municipalities. Then (1−α)
might be interpreted as that part of wage taxes that directly ﬂows to municipalities (and
that would therefore not be regarded as part of the labor costs by local decision makers)
while α denotes tax revenues that ﬁrst ﬂow to a higher tier in the federal system in order
to be returned, in a lump-sum fashion, to the local level afterwards. Then the local sector
would employ labor on the base of a cost of w(1 − αt) per hour.




rK1 + w(1 − αt)L1|F
1(L1,K1) ≥ ¯ F
1￿
(10)









Denote the solutions to (10) by K1(α) and L1(α). Similarly, we might index all other
variables by α. From a mathematical perspective, the advantage from using continuous α
rather than a dichotomous α ∈ {0,1} lies in making the whole problem “diﬀerentiable”.
Equation (11) together with the output constraint obviously implies that labor input in
sector 1 is higher and consequently capital input is lower the larger is α, implying that
labor intensity is ceteris paribus higher when sector 1 is government-owned rather than
when it is privatized. We will below show that this pattern also emerges in a general
equilibrium.
Our model is closed by the government budget constraint:
• We assume that in the case where production in sector 1 is outsourced to the private
sector, the government procures the output from there. The price for output ¯ F 1
has at least to cover the costs of production; otherwise no private supplier can be
found. I.e., the procurement cost for ¯ F 1 are at least
r · K1(0) + w · L1(0).
Government revenues stem from taxes on employment in the two sectors, i.e., they
amount to
t · w · (L1(0) + L2(0)).
9A balanced budget therefore requires
rK1(0) + w(1 − t)L1(0) = twL2(0).
• Now suppose that production of good 1 takes place in the government sector. From
(8), the costs of production amount to rK1(1)+ w(1− t)L1(1). Revenues now only
come from labor employed in the production of good 2 (since workers in sector 1
are paid there net wages directly and do not transfer back any money to the gov-
ernment), such that the budget constraint reads:
rK1(1) + w(1 − t)L1(1) = twL2(1)
— which is the same as in the previous case (noting, of course that the input
variables may take on diﬀerent values).
Generalizing with the use of α, this does not change; the government budget always has
the form:
rK1(α) + w(1 − t)L1(α) = twL2(α)
or, upon using that r = F 2
K and L2 = LS − L1,
F
2
K · K1(α) + w · (L1(α) − tLS) = 0. (12)
Summarizing (1) to (5), and incorporating (11) and (12), the equilibrium of the economy











K(L1,K1) · w · (1 − αt) = 0 (13)
F
1(L1,K1) − ¯ F





LS[w(1 − t)] − L1, ¯ K − K1
￿





LS[w(1 − t)] − L1, ¯ K − K1
￿
· K1 + w · (L1 − tLS[w(1 − t)]) = 0. (16)
The ﬁrst of these equations is the cost-eﬃciency condition for the production of good 1,
the second one is the minimal-output requirement for that good, the third one is the
condition for proﬁt-maximizing labor input in the production of good 2, and the last one
10is the government budget constraint. The four equations (13) through (16) have to be
solved for the variables L1, K1, w, and t from which all other endogenous variables of the
model can then be determined. The solution can be parametrized by α.
Observe that an eﬃcient allocation of factors of production requires that the marginal











In our model, this will happen if and only if α = 0, i.e., if sector 1 is under private control.7
4 Comparative statics
To avoid some technical complications we will henceforth always assume that F i
KL ≥ 0 for
i = 1,2. This implies that a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm in sector i would decrease its demand
for a factor whenever the price of the other factor increases. The assumption FKL ≥ 0 is,
e.g., satisﬁed for all CES-functions F = (γK ·Kρ +γL ·Lρ)1/ρ with ρ ≤ 1 and γK,γL > 0.
We derive comparative statics of (13) to (16) with respect to the tax advantage α of public
ﬁrms. We obtain:
Proposition 1 Suppose that L0 > 0, F 2
KL > 0 and that the equilibrium of the economy
exhibits Hicksian stability. Assume further that
• the elasticity of labor supply does not exceed (1 − t)/t, or
• the tax rate t is small.
Then labor input in sector 1 is higher and capital input is lower if the sector is government-
run rather than if it is outsourced. The eﬀects on the equilibrium gross wage and the tax
rate are generally ambiguous.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (13) to (16) with respect to α yields the following system of
7One could, of course, also nationalize sector 2 to obtain production eﬃciency in our simpliﬁed model.








a1 a2 a3 a4
b1 b2 0 0
c1 c2 c3 c4


















































































































d3 = −tLS + L1 − wtL
0













Denote the matrix on the LHS of (18) by A. Observe that we arranged the matrix such
that the diagonal elements a1, b2, and c3 are negative. Also d4 will be negative for small
values of t or, as long as t ≤ 0.5 if the elasticity of labor supply is below unity. In order for
the system to be perfectly stable (i.e., stable in the Hicksian sense), we must then have
that A is negative semi-deﬁnite. In particular, detA > 0 — which we will henceforth






12where the positive sign prevails when A is stable. Now apply Cramer’s Rule to (18):
dL1
dα
= β · (c3d4 − c4d3) · F
1
K























































= −β · (b2(c4d1 − c1d4) + b1(c2d4 − c4d2))



































































































which is of ambiguous sign. Given the assumptions mentioned in the proposition, the
signs of (19) and (20) turn out as asserted, while the signs of (21) and (22) remain un-
clear in general. ￿
Observe that the condition ηS ≤ (1−t)/t in Proposition 1 is equivalent to the requirement














This is in harmony with stylized facts on labor supply elasticities. Moreover, if this
condition were not satisﬁed, then an increase in t would ceteris paribus reduce (statutory)
wage tax revenue twLS[w(1−t)]. Next consider the case of a ﬁxed labor supply (L0
S = 0):
Proposition 2 Suppose that L0 = 0 and that the equilibrium exhibits Hicksian stability.
Then labor input in sector 1 is higher and capital input is lower if the sector is government-
run rather than if it is outsourced. If production of good 1 is outsourced, the equilibrium
gross wage will decrease while the eﬀect on the tax rate is unclear.
135 Welfare analysis
Should sector 1 be outsourced or government-run? There is a potential trade-oﬀ: Only
if the sector is privatized (α = 0), production eﬃciency in the sense of (17) would be
achieved, meaning that the inputs available are used such as to maximize the output of
good 2 (recall that the output of good 1 is exogenously ﬁxed). On the other hand, if
nationalizing production in sector 1 (α = 1) leads to a higher net wage w(1−t) and, thus,
to larger labor supply, the total amount of available productive resources in the economy
increases and output in sector 2 can be augmented.
An instructive way to view this trade-oﬀ is in terms of an Edgeworth box for the produc-















Figure 1 depicts production possibilities for α = 0 (fully privatized economy). The econ-
omy will be in a point like A: Production is eﬃciently organized — the isoquants of the
production functions in sectors 1 and 2 are tangent. The output level in sector 2 is F 2(0).



















Figure 2 depicts production possibilities in the case of α > 0 (mixed economy), provided
that this leads to an increase in the net wage. As a consequence, the width of this Edge-
worth box is larger than in Figure 1, reﬂecting the increase in labor supply. Compared to
the box in Figure 1, the origin of sector 2 moves outwards and the previously unattainable
output level F 2(α) becomes feasible now. However, the economy ends up in a point like
B: Sectors 1 and 2 face diﬀerent factor-price ratios, and consequently isoquants at the
equilibrium output levels will intersect rather than being tangent to each other. In a
nutshell, the potential diﬀerence between a fully private economy (Figure 1) and a mixed
economy (Figure 2) boils down to operating eﬃciently in a “small” Edgeworth box and
operating ineﬃciently in a larger one.
From Propositions 1 and equation (28), it is unclear whether the case depicted in Figure 2
can at all prevail; it requires an increase in labor supply. Moreover, our set-up and results
so far do not allow for any welfare comparisons between the two cases. We therefore have
to be more explicit on the underlying structure of our model.
Let us ﬁrst, however, state quite an obvious result:
Proposition 3 If labor supply is ﬁxed (L0
S ≡ 0), then fully outsourcing sector 1 (i.e.,
α = 0) is welfare-optimal.
15Proof: Both capital and labor are in ﬁxed supply. Eﬃciency requires (17) to hold, which
will only happen if α = 0. ￿
In the case of a variable labor supply, things get trickier. Implicitly underlying our model
is a representative household with preferences over the consumed amounts of goods 1
and 2 and leisure. Let us represent these preferences by a standard utility function:
U = U(c1,c2,−LS)
where all partial derivatives are positive. Consumption of good 1 equals the exogenous
output in sector 1. The household maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint
c2 ≤ y + w(1 − t)LS
where y denotes income from sources other than labor supply (i.e., capital income and
proﬁts, if any, from sector 2 and capital income from sector 1). Optimal labor supply
satisﬁes the FOC:
w(1 − t)U2 − U3 = 0. (23)
Again taking into account that output of good 1 is exogenously ﬁxed, a change in α would


















where we made use of (23). Hence, we have to check for conditions such that
dc2
dα




Obeying that c2 = F 2(K2,L2), we next investigate what happens to the output in the
















































Here we invoked dK1/dα = −(1 − αt)(F 2
L/F 2
K)(dL1/dα). If labor supply is ﬁxed (dLS =
0), then output in sector 2 decreases whenever production of good 1 is nationalized. This
16is intuitive: For α 6= 0, the factor allocation will be ineﬃcient. With a ﬁxed output ¯ F 1
and ﬁxed total supplies of both factors, output in sector 2 cannot but decline (as shown
in Proposition 3). A negative impact of α on labor supply would acerbate this eﬀect; only
with a positive impact on labor supply can the eﬀect be turned.




























Condition (26) states a very simple requirement for an increase in α to be welfare-
improving: The eﬀect of such a change on labor supply (i.e., on total labor in the economy)
must exceed α times the eﬀect on labor intake in sector 1. An immediate consequence
of this is that starting from a fully privatized economy (α = 0), an increase in α will be
welfare-improving if and only if it leads to an increase in labor supply or, which is the
same, to an increase in the net wage.
Given that dL1/dα > 0 is very likely from Proposition 1, the equivalent condition (27)
conveys that a welfare improvement is possible only if the net wage increases — and
increases suﬃciently sharply – upon an increase in α (or, conversely, if outsourcing leads
to a suﬃciently large drop in after-tax wages).
It is interesting to observe that whenever outsourcing would decrease the wage rate it can
never be optimal to fully outsource sector 1: The LHS in (27) is always larger than zero.
We sum this up in
Proposition 4 Full outsourcing can never be optimal if it would lead to a decrease in net
wages.
Increasing α is welfare-improving if it would lead to a suﬃciently large increase in the
after-tax wage.
Proposition 4 is a typical second best result: With variable labor supply, wage taxation is
distortionary in the sense that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and the
consumption of good 2, U3/U2 = w(1 − t), does not equal the marginal productivity of
labor in the production of good 2, F 2
L = w. In such a scenario, it may then not be optimal
17to achieve production eﬃciency in the sense of condition (17). Violations of condition
(17) can be “fabricated” by giving sector 1 a tax advantage over sector 2, which in our
framework means to (partly) have this sector government-operated. One visible impact
of such a policy is then a higher labor intensity of the public sector, relative to what a
private enterprise would choose to have. This is in line with empirical observations (cf.,
e.g., Megginson and Netter, 2001).
Proposition 4 states conditions such that full privatization (α = 0) is not optimal. This
need, however, not imply that welfare when the government fully takes over sector 1 (α =
1) is higher. Rather, intermediate values of α might dominate the polar cases. As outlined
above, one way to think of such intermediate values is in terms of a mixed personnel
structure (both civil servants and normal employees) or of partial privatization. Then
Proposition 4 conveys that entirely staﬃng sector 1 with normal employees (represented
by α = 0) is not optimal, but that to have some tax-favored civil servants (α > 0)
might actually be preferable. An alternative interpretation is that the mechanism that
we identify provides an eﬃciency-justiﬁcation for a federal structure in which lower-level
governments have a tax-advantage in their production as they receive a certain fraction of
wage tax revenues. As giving lower-level governments a full tax advantage (α = 1) need
not be optimal, our results also suggest an eﬃciency-explanation for a certain degree of
ﬁscal churning in which the federal government would collect a share (1 − α) of the tax
revenue and return it to lower-level governments as lump-sum transfers.
The crucial question arising from Proposition 4 is, of course, whether the net wage does
at all (and then suﬃciently steeply) increase in α. From Proposition 1 this is not clear.
Combine (21) and (22) to calculate:
d[w(1 − t)]
dα
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To arrive at the ﬁnal line of (28), we made use of F 1
Kw − F 1
LF 2
K = F 1




Kwαt which stems from (3), (4), and (10). From this, we get that
• for the case of ﬁxed labor supply, the net wage will increase in α, provided that αt
is small;
• for the case of variable labor supply, the eﬀect of α on the net wage is generally
unclear: It is more likely to be positive [negative] if the labor supply elasticity is
small [large].
Combining (27) and (28), one sees that there are opposing forces at work: If the supply
elasticity of labor is too small, then the RHS of (27) tends to be large (making the whole
condition less likely to be satisﬁed) while for a high supply elasticity the LHS gets small
(again making the whole condition less probable to hold).
While this observation renders general results unobtainable, we can at least state that
for low but positive labor supply elasticities a zero value for α cannot be optimal. To see
this, recall from (27) that an increase in the net wage suﬃces to make deviations from
α = 0 worthwhile. From (28) we learn that this will happen in the case of positive, but
small labor-supply elasticities. We summarize:
Proposition 5 Full privatization (α = 0) can never be optimal if the labor supply elas-
ticity is positive, but small.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between privatization and taxation from a
general-equilibrium perspective. We take as our starting point that several services, like
hospitals, schools, and public transportation, can be produced privately, even if they would
be ultimately ﬁnanced by the government. Empirical evidence suggests that outsourcing
or privatizing such activities tends to result in a leaner workforce and increasing capital
intensity in their production. This is often viewed as an evidence of slack in public
production, but we show that this need not be the case. Governmental entities often
operate under a diﬀerent tax regime with respect to factor inputs: In a consolidated
government budget, tax payments by government entities cancel out; the government
“pays taxes to itself”. As a consequence, when the government purchases factor inputs,
19its true factor costs are the net factor returns (as they are earned by the suppliers of these
factors) rather than the tax-inclusive factor prices which underlie the cost calculations
in private ﬁrms. This implies that the government sector has a cost advantage over the
private sector for that factor that is taxed relatively more heavily. As labor is taxed more
heavily than capital, the government would then optimally organize production in a more
labor-intensive way than a private ﬁrm. Put diﬀerently: Observing a diﬀerent factor mix
in private and public production need not be indicative of wasteful slack in the government
sector but may well be the entirely optimal response to tax-induced diﬀerences in factor
price ratios.
Moreover, it is not at all evident that diﬀerent factor price ratios and, therefore, diﬀerent
marginal rates of technical substitution in public and private production are an evil. We
identify a key tradeoﬀ in deciding whether to fully privatize or outsource government
activities or not. On the one hand, diﬀerent factor prices faced by public and private
entities distort allocative eﬃciency. In a mainly market-based economy, this would call
for fully outsourcing production from the tax-sheltered realm of government. On the
other hand, a higher labor-intensity of government-run activities may serve as a counter-
vailing distortion in the presence of distorting wage taxation. Outsourcing government
production and then letting the government re-purchase the output may, under plausible
circumstances, result in a larger overall tax bill. Privatization then would expose the
economy to a higher degree of distortionary taxation than “nationalized” production. If
the distortionary eﬀects of taxation are suﬃciently severe it may well prove beneﬁcial to
incur the production ineﬃciencies in a mixed economy with a private and a tax-favored
public sector, compared to a production-eﬃcient economy suﬀering from larger tax dis-
tortions. In our setting, tax distortions result from a reduction in labor supply, implying
that the total amount of productive resources in a fully privatized economy falls short of
that in a mixed economy. Consequently, we argue that full privatization is never optimal
with positive but low labor supply elasticities, as in Europe. On the other hand, if labor
supply is ﬁxed, then full privatization will be eﬃcient.
Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) conclude their analysis of privatization and capital income
taxation by stating that the “need to impose distortionary taxes ... shifts the demarcation
line between the two [i.e., private and public] sectors towards a larger public production
sector” (p. 412) — where the size of the public sector refers to the range of diﬀerent
20outputs that is produced in government-owned ﬁrms. Deﬁning the size of the public
sector by its labor intake rather than by its range of outputs, our paper conﬁrms this
insight. However, unlike Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) and the rest of the literature, our
analysis does not presuppose that the public sector per se is less eﬃcient than private
enterprises.
Our ﬁndings provide an eﬃciency-argument in favor of otherwise-puzzling tax advantage
given to public employees in some countries, like Germany, Italy and Austria. There,
civil servants are subject to social security taxation only to a lesser extent than normal
employees, rendering them cheaper to hire for the government than standard employees.
We ﬁnd that such an arrangement is eﬃcient at least to some degree, as long as labor
supply is not completely inelastic.
For public production that takes place at lower-level jurisdictions, like municipalities, our
analysis also suggests an eﬃciency argument for the otherwise puzzling phenomenon of
ﬁscal churning in which the federal government would collect a share of tax revenues and
return it as lump-sum transfers to all lower-level jurisdictions, and not just to poorer
ones. We identiﬁed that even though full outsourcing would not be generally eﬃcient,
also giving the public sector a full tax advantage could be ineﬃcient. Fiscal churning
can then be used to adjust the price that lower-level jurisdisctions eﬀectively face when
ﬁnancing their production of public goods.
Our ﬁndings also suggest an empirically testable prediction. Countries in which lower-
level governments are able to keep a larger share of wage tax revenues should have more
labor-intensive public sector at that level. Conversely, changes in revenue-sharing between
central-level and lower level governments should have implications for labor-intensity of
the public sector at the lower level governments.
There are several ways in which our analysis could be extended. E.g., one might consider
a small open economy where the rental rate of capital is exogenously given. Moreover,
one could dispense with the assumption that governments are price takers on the factor
markets. While this is an appropriate assumption in the case of local municipalities and
individual government agencies, it is implausible for the central level of government as a
whole. These extensions, as well as empirical testing of the predictions and evaluation of
quantitative importance of our ﬁndings, are left for further research.
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